Public opinion finds the feat of these private operators staggering, as they set up, in a flash and almost surreptitiously, such a lucrative waste collection business (two million centimes in daily revenue) and then disappear into the wild, hardly honouring the harvest sites anymore, even just to see for themselves how their golden business is evolving.

No less confusing for the common man is the fact that such a lucrative business has been running exclusively since its inception thanks to equipment graciously offered by the State (a windfall of 6,172,730 dirhams – article 8 of the Management Convention) and staff—99% local—paid almost 100% by the two municipalities (an annual bill of 2,841,910.94 dirhams in 2008 – article 33 of the CPS).

Worse, the private operator acts as he pleases, doing only what he wants, ignoring the provisions of the CPS and the delegated management convention, because he hardly cares about the delegating authority, which he has managed to reduce to a mere accomplice.

Lacking any budget, devoid of any material or other means, the "Ahmar for the Protection of the Environment" group of communes owes its survival only to the pittance paid by the delegate, which publicly covers its operating expenses (fuel, office supplies, staff emoluments). One cannot, therefore, expect the latter to normally fulfil its mission (control, monitoring of services, and, if necessary, sanctioning of infractions – articles 9 and 45 of the CPS). Hence a multitude of infractions.

The delegate, operating in conquered territory, persists in ignoring the provisions committing it to "implement all necessary means and staff (executives and execution agents) having the professional skills to perform the services provided for under the terms of the contract" (article 3 of the management convention).

The staff—poorly qualified, poorly motivated, unsupervised—manifestly lacks equipment, lives in deplorable hygienic conditions, and receives no training (article 36 of the CPS). The recruitment of labour—at the commune's expense but carried out by the group—indulges in the most abject clientelism and favouritism.

Despite the manifest insufficiency of rolling stock—moreover, dilapidated, worn out by overexploitation, in a word, unusable—the delegate has neither "supplemented the equipment made available to it with new equipment" (article 39 of the CPS), nor "had the mechanical machines necessary for the execution of the mission in sufficient number, capacity, and performance..." (article 2 of the delegated management convention).

For example, the four 4 m³ pick-ups assigned—in Chemaïa—to the collection, cleaning, and treatment of bins and illegal dumps have never been able to properly perform their tasks over an area of 19 km² and serve 5,000 households daily. They can do so even less now that they are fit for the scrapyard, especially since the loader, which used to come to the rescue once a week from Youssoufia, has long been paralysed.

Result: cleaning has never been generalised to all public roads and squares of the city as stipulated by article 20 of the CPS. On the other hand, the delegate receives substantial sums for services not performed.

Collection is inefficient, as evidenced by the following dysfunctions: hasty and therefore defective treatment of waste, partial treatment of a large number of neighbourhoods, episodic non-treatment of certain neighbourhoods, non-treatment of the market (joutia) and the weekly Souk, proliferation of illegal waste dumps; in short, two municipalities in a deplorable state.

Finally, let us point out that since waste collection is not subject to any quantification and cleaning is only half-assured, the remuneration for services has been carried out—for three and a half years—in violation of the provisions of the CPS of the delegated management convention (Article 12 of the convention & article 51 of the CPS) and the laws in force.

* Second Vice-President of the Chemaïa commune